Egypt: Military vs. Revolutionary by Radinovic-Lukic, Marta & Mannheimer, Edgar
Lunds universitet  STVA22 
Statsvetenskapliga institutionen  HT13 
  Handledare: Anders Sannerstedt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Egypt: 
Military vs. Revolutionary 
Why Structures are Stronger than Individuals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marta Radinovic-Lukic & Edgar Mannheimer 
 
  
Abstract 
The aim of this thesis has been to provide explanations on why Egypt’s 
democratization process has failed. The central question has thus been: Why has 
the democratic transition failed in Egypt after a popular revolution and democratic 
elections secured the country’s first ever civilian government in the summer of 
2012? By using the relevant theories on transitology we have sought to answer 
our question by analyzing the actions of the main political actors in Egypt. With 
focus on mainly the events after the Egyptian revolution, we have used various 
sources made up of personal interviews, scientific articles and recent news 
reports.  
Our findings show that two main political actors, the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the military, to this day act under authoritarian tactics. Thus, Egypt has only 
succeeded in taking a shape of an “authoritarian-democratic hybrid” regime where 
political elites manipulate democratic institutions to serve their own self-interests. 
Until the authoritarian core of Egypt is crushed, democracy cannot and will not 
prevail. 
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1  Introduction 
It is widely believed that democracy is the “least bad” form of government. It 
is the only form of government which has been able to achieve close to complete 
equality, welfare and freedom. The authors of this paper believe that democracy is 
the best system in which resources are equally distributed to a population. We 
therefore also believe that in countries that lack democratic features, 
democratization is a necessary process to achieve the goal of a functioning 
democracy. After this “goal” is reached, a country should continue striving for 
better and more equal freedoms and general welfare, and the means to do so will 
be in place much more than in a non-democracy. 
Egypt is considered a non-democracy, and after centuries of foreign rule, it 
succumbed to a modern military-state established in the 1952 military coup by the 
Egyptian officer Gamal Abdel Nasser (Rogan, 2009, p.284). In 2011, the country 
experienced a popular revolution which toppled ex-President Hosni Mubarak. 
This revolution called for an end to corruption, police brutality, freedom of 
expression, and greater equality and resource distribution. It had no clear leader or 
ideology; it simply demanded basic human rights (Ahram Online, 2013b). Since 
then, five nation-wide elections have taken place, two governments have been 
ousted, and one military coup has brought the entire process full circle; back to 
the authoritarian, military rule that sparked the revolutionary reaction in the first 
place (Brown, 2013, p.46). The authors of this paper believe that Egypt’s 
democratic process has been abruptly hindered by a military structure bent on 
preserving themselves. Egypt’s democratic transition has not failed permanently, 
but for now, any hope of a democratic consolidation between the terrorist-labeled 
Muslim Brotherhood (BBC, 2013a) and the military, will be close to impossible in 
the near future. For this reason, we consider the process as “temporarily” failed. 
Therefore, the difficult, but equally interesting question we ask ourselves in this 
essay is: 
Why has the democratic transition failed in Egypt after a popular revolution 
and democratic elections secured the country’s first ever civilian government in 
the summer of 2012? 
Egypt is undergoing a phase of democratization and therefore the relevant 
theories for our analysis are those provided in the field of democratization. In this 
field of study we found the theories on transitology especially interesting and 
relevant. These theories focus mainly on political actors in the process of 
democratization and are further explained in the third chapter. Our 
methodological approach is defined in the forthcoming section and the fourth 
chapter is dedicated to the historical background of Egypt. The analysis, that 
provides an answer to our question, is presented in the fifth chapter and followed 
up by our conclusions in the sixth and final chapter.  
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2 Methodology 
We have made several choices in order to define our methodological approach. 
The main purpose of the paper is to explain what led to Egypt’s “failed” 
democratization and therefore we chose to apply a theory-consuming qualitative 
case study. In the following sections lies explanations to the case-study approach, 
and a more substantial explanation of our methodological framework. 
2.1 Empirical case study 
There are different types of empirical studies; one with the ambition to explain the 
chosen outcomes of a case, and the other with the ambition to describe the 
outcomes of a case. In our research, we have used the empirical case study 
method to explain the outcomes with the help of given theories, in our case the 
transitology theories (Esaiasson et.al., 2012, p.89-90). By combining historical 
and contemporary research with a relevant theory, the case study has proven to be 
a good analyzing tool that increases the understandings of a certain case (Teorell 
and Svensson, 2007, p.236). By implementing this method, our intentions are not 
to draw conclusions on the development in other Arab countries in general, but 
instead focus on Egypt and investigate whether the chosen theories apply to our 
specific case. In this aspect, we hope to achieve a great amount of internal validity 
(Esaiasson et.al., 2012, p.89-90). 
2.2 Material 
The material we have used consists of both primary and secondary sources. Our 
primary sources are made up of several interviews with people that, in different 
ways, are connected to the Egyptian democratization process (see Appendix 1). 
By applying this method, we have a greater capability to provide unexpected and 
widely explanatory answers (Esaiasson et.al., 2012, p.251). Also, it is of great 
importance that the people interviewed hold great centrality because they are 
expected to possess specific knowledge that is important to explain a certain event 
or concept (ibid. 2012, p.262). The people we have interviewed represent different 
actors of the democratization process and have a profession that allows them to be 
considered as experts in their fields. Due to these facts, these interviews have 
indeed contributed in widening our knowledge of the situation in Egypt (for more 
information on the interviews, check Appendix 1 and 2). 
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Furthermore, we have used a great deal of secondary sources such as 
books, scientific articles and news stories that are related to Egypt’s 
democratization and to the transitology theories. In our theory section we have 
mainly practiced O’Donnell and Schmitter’s book Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies and Stepan and Linz 
article Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring’. During our analysis, we 
have looked for recent research articles such as Brown’s Egypt’s Failed 
Transition; Taher’s The New Egyptian Constitution: An Outcome of a Complex 
Political Process; Said’s The Paradox of Transition to ‘Democracy’ under 
Military Rule and many more. For the historical context we have chosen the 
critically acclaimed book The Arabs by the director of the Middle East Center at 
Oxford University, Eugene Rogan. We also find it of great importance to be up-
to-date with the democratization process which resulted in the usage of a variety 
of sources found in reliable newspapers such as: the BBC, Al Jazeera, The 
Guardian etc. The Egyptian democratization process is still ongoing and thus 
these news articles have provided information on the development in the country 
according as it happened. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
In order to explain and analyze democratization in Egypt, we have primarily used 
theories about transitology first developed by Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz in The 
Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Stepan and Linz, 1978), and further 
developed by Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter in Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Since O’Donnell and Schmitter’s definitions of 
central concepts such as liberalization and transition have come to be standard 
definitions in transitology theory, it is these we have used during our research 
(Linde and Ekman, 2006, p.103). Furthermore, Stepan and Linz have recently 
developed additional theories to include cases of the “Arab Spring” in 
Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring’, which have proven useful to us 
(Stepan and Linz, 2013). 
3.1 Transitology 
The modern transitology theories emerged in the context of the third democratic 
wave during the 1980’s. As the theories grew; they put an emphasis on different 
actors’ strategies and choices in changing political processes. By focusing on 
political conditions, transitology explained democratization in a purely political 
context. Therefore, democratization came to be seen as a political process, where 
democratic development went through analytically distinct phases of transition 
and consolidation (Linde and Ekman, 2006, p.101). The most powerful thought 
within transitology is that the transition itself, explains why some states reach 
democracy while others fail to do so (Karvonen, 1996, p.75). 
3.1.1 O’Donnell and Schmitter on transitology 
The transition, according to O’Donnell and Schmitter, represents the interval 
between one political regime to another. During the transition the political game-
rules are not defined, and the included actors struggle to satisfy their self-interests 
and the interests of those they are trying to represent. The authors argue that 
during these transitions, the framework tends to be in the hands of authoritarian 
rulers. These rulers tend to retain power which in a stable democracy would be 
protected by the constitution and various other institutions (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, 1986, p.6) 
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In order to reach democracy, O’Donnell and Schmitter claim that 
liberalization is the starting process when certain rights are created to protect both 
individuals and social groups from illegal acts committed primarily by the state. 
These rights include: guarantee of private home and correspondence; the right to 
be defended in trial according to preestablished laws; freedom of movement, 
speech and petition etc. On a collective level they include freedom from 
punishment for expressions against the government, freedom from censorship of 
means of communication, and freedom to associate voluntarily with other citizens. 
If these “liberal” rights are not overtly threatening to the government, they 
eventually become institutionalized and form a relation between liberalization and 
democratization (ibid. 1986, p.7) 
When these rights are truly respected, the liberalization process is 
complete and the democratization process kicks in. This process holds citizenship 
as the guiding principle, a principle that involves the right to be treated equally by 
fellow humans, while at the same time respect is paid to the outcome of collective 
choices. The obligation of those implementing such choices should be equally 
accountable and accessible to all members of the polity. Citizenship stands, in 
other words, for a mutual respect between the rulers and the ruled. To embody the 
citizenship principle there are multiple approaches but no single set of specific 
institutions or rules that by themselves define democracy and embrace citizenship. 
On the other hand, O’Donnell and Schmitter argue that there are necessary 
elements to reach minimal political democracy and these are: secret balloting, 
universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational 
recognition and access, and executive accountability (ibid. 1986, p.7-8). 
Democratization is therefore seen as an extension of liberalization and includes 
the political sphere (Karvonen, 1996, p.76-77).   
It is also important to note that democratization and liberalization do not 
always go hand in hand. Authoritarian rulers may promote liberalization because 
of the belief that by opening up limited spaces for individual and group action, 
they can relieve pressures and obtain needed information and support without 
jeopardizing the structure of authority. Liberalization and democratization are thus 
not synonymous, and a democracy cannot prevail if the principle of citizenship is 
not respected (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p.8-9). 
 
3.1.2 Importance and the framework of the political elites 
In The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, a project led by Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan, the authors came to the conclusion that a lack of efficiency together with 
popular disapproval could result in a rise of the anti-democratic opposition. In a 
situation like that, the democratic forces’ strategies have a resolving role. The 
most efficient way to avoid a failed democratization is therefore to strengthen the 
executive powers, and show a united front against the anti-democratic forces. The 
main conclusion of the project is that the actions of political elites determine if 
democracy succeeds or fails (Linde and Ekman, 2006, p.101-103). 
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These elites, that could be referred to as the democratic architects, need to 
deal with five conditions during the transition process, according to a German 
scientist Manfred Schmidt. Firstly, the elites should create new game-rules; work 
as contact ties between opposing groups; form new institutions and take care of 
economic issues. Second, they need to bear in mind how to handle the 
representatives of the former government. The third issue deals with the 
problematic fact that transition processes often go hand in hand with greater 
economic crises while there often occurs an increased demand for better living 
standards from the population. The fourth issue is that the political instability 
creates cautiousness when it comes to economic activity and investments, which 
in turn creates even wider cleavages between economic expectations and 
economic realities. Finally, Schmidt argues, religious and national conflicts are 
often activated in relation to transition processes (Karvonen, 1996, p.76-78). 
Schmidt’s theories derive, one could argue, from O’Donnell and Schmitters’ 
where they consider that the political development during the transition period is 
characterized by uncertainty because the political game-rules are not yet defined. 
Therefore transitology deals, according to O’Donnell and Schmitter, above all 
with what game-rules should be applied. In other words, transitology deals with 
the question of how political institutions should be designed and which actors 
should get access to them (Linde and Ekman, 2006, p.103-104). 
Another theory developed by O’Donnell and Schmitter, concerns the 
relationship between the non-democratic government and the growing democratic 
opposition that provides a solution to the issues presented above. They argue that 
the transition represents a negotiation, or settlement, between the weakened 
regime and the growing pro-democratic forces (Linde and Ekman, 2006, p.105). 
These kinds of negotiations are included in the concept of “pacts”, defined as: “an 
explicit agreement among a select set of actors which seek to define rules 
governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital 
interests’ of those entering into it.” The pacts are often seen as temporary 
solutions in order to avoid worrying outcomes, but could lead the way to a more 
permanent agreement for resolution of the conflict (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 
1986, p.37). 
3.2 Transitology and the “Arab Spring” 
In an article Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz have furthered their democratization 
theories to include the special cases of the Arab countries. They included new 
perspectives needed to shed light on the events during the “Arab spring”, and 
these have proven relevant to our case study by providing an important analyzing 
tool. The most important one concerns a hybrid form of regime that resembles 
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s theory on regimes that have endorsed a limited 
liberalization process but not necessarily the democratization process (Stepan and 
Linz, 2013, p.15). 
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3.2.1 Authoritarian-democratic hybrids 
Often when a country lacks good structural prerequisites for democracy, which 
results in a bad transition. Therefore, it is of great importance to study what 
characteristics the regime used to have before it started its transition (Karvonen, 
1996, p.90). Since Egypt’s regime was and is regarded as authoritarian, it is 
important to present some characteristics of these regimes. Often, these regimes 
are led by one person or a smaller group that exercise power within fuzzy but 
relatively predictable lines. Some of the regimes have been military regimes that 
have taken hold of political power by force and afterwards kept it by 
implementing fear or, if needed, by use of force. In addition, they sought 
legitimacy with the population by different reform and developing programs 
(Linde and Ekman, 2006, p.111-116). 
These regimes quite often become, as Stepan and Linz call it, 
“authoritarian-democratic hybrids”. In these regimes the most important political 
actors believe they will lose legitimacy and support if they fail to embrace core 
features of democracy such as elections, while at the same time believe they must 
keep authoritarian controls on key aspects of the emerging polity in hope to 
further their goals and retain their supporters. This phenomenon is seen as a 
“situation” because it will most likely fail to become institutionalized. Ideally it 
should develop into a transition to democracy, but most usually, the ruling 
apparatus will not find democracy appealing, and will turn the country back to 
fully-fledged authoritarianism (Stepan and Linz, 2013, p.20-21). 
It is specific events that trigger these situations and start the liberalization 
process, such as the protests on Tahrir Square. In Egypt, this was caused by a 
growing sense of individual dignity, people seeing themselves as citizens rather 
than subjects, and a feeling that democracy is something that should be expected. 
(ibid. 2013, p.20-21). 
In order for this regime type to make fulfill a transition to democracy, the 
authors argue that not only civil society, but also political society play important 
roles. The civil society plays a vital role in order to destroy an authoritarian 
regime, but political society is crucial for the construction and consolidation of a 
new democracy. The argument is that there must be organized groups of political 
activists that can resist dictatorship, and also peacefully debate amongst them on 
how they can reach consensus and a democratic alternative. A democratic political 
society demands that the different actors have political engagements with each 
other in order to reach an agreement. In this respect, the drafting of the 
constitution comes to play a significant role (ibid. 2013, p.22-23). 
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4 Historical Context 
4.1 Background on Egyptian politics 
On the 23rd of July 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser and a group of army officers - 
“The Free Officers” - organized a military coup against the monarchy which, 
under a British colonial system, ruled Egypt at the time (Rogan, 2009, p.284). 
Together with his co-conspirators, Nasser established Egypt’s first socialist 
republic with its first president, officer Mohammed Naguib. After two years in 
office, Naguib was ousted by Nasser and put under house arrest during a Nasserist 
purge of his rivals, which included the arrest of thousands of Muslim Brothers 
(ibid. 2009, p.288). Nasser, along with the other Free Officers, drafted a new 
constitution for the Egyptian Republic. The constitution was not finalized until 
1956 and lasted for only two years (El Masry, 2012). Nasser and the military 
cracked down on any political dissent such as Muslim Brothers, communists, and 
former regime loyalists. Nasser also established a one-party system and by 
censoring and restricting, held a tight grasp around the media (Rogan, 2009, 
p.288). 
What made these seemingly Stalinist purges possible for Nasser was his 
immense popular support. Poverty and unemployment were rising during King 
Farouq (whom Nasser ousted), and the monarchy was seen as a colonial puppet, 
whose strings were pulled by the British Empire (ibid. 2009, p.277). Nasser 
represented many things which were in stark contrast to Farouq: his family was 
not a part of the “high society” in Cairo, the society which dominated Egyptian 
government and politics. He called for social reforms to redistribute Egypt’s 
wealth to its people in the most equal way possible (ibid. 2009, p.286). Perhaps 
most important of all was the fact that he was a strong Egyptian1 military leader, 
perceived to be able to crush Western powers who attempted to colonize Egypt 
and exploit the Suez Canal, while he also dared to stand up against Israel. He and 
the Arab coalition however suffered immense losses during the 1967 war with 
Israel where Egypt’s entire air-force was destroyed in a matter of hours, and the 
Sinai peninsula got occupied by Israel (ibid. 2009, p.337). Nasser was heart-
broken, and probably angry with himself at this grave miscalculation and 
attempted to resign. Due to popular support and outcry for him to stay, he 
remained in office until he died of a heart-attack three years later, in 1970 (ibid. 
2009, p.340). 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 King Farouq was in fact not Egyptian. He was a direct descendant of Muahmed Ali, an ethnic albanian ruler 
who established his family’s dynasty in 1805 (Rogan, 2009, p. 83). 
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When Nasser died, his vice-president Anwar Sadat (also a member of the 
Free-Officer military coup in 1952) took over the presidency (ibid. 2009, p.365). 
The most striking event during his mandate was the signing of a peace-treaty with 
Israel in 1979. Ever since that treaty, the US has supported Egypt with annual 
military aid (ibid. 2009, p.392). In 1981, during a military exhibition, Sadat was 
gunned down by Islamist militants disguised as government troops and died 
immediately. The Assassin cried out: “I have killed Pharaoh, and I do not fear 
death.” (ibid. 2009, p.398). 
4.2 Recent political development 
This is when the vice-president Hosni Mubarak came to power. According to the 
Al Jazeera documentary, The Family, Mubarak suspended the constitution, 
established the “emergency law”, and banned the Muslim Brotherhood once again 
(The Family, 2012). Mubarak’s early rule attempted (on the surface) to promote 
democracy and other liberal freedoms, but with the help of the emergency law his 
rule quickly turned authoritarian when he expanded the secret police’ and his own 
powers. His government did nothing to reform the economic policies that were, 
and still are crippling the Egyptian economy. His refusal to institute any real 
reforms was partly what led to the January 25 revolution of 2011 (ibid, 2012). The 
revolution was started by a call for mass protests by different youth organizations 
such as the April 6th and Kefaya (“enough”) movements. These youth protests 
quickly (and unexpectedly) exploded in nation-wide demonstrations including 
several millions of people (Masoud, 2011, p.21). This revolution had no clear 
ideology and no single leader; but however it did have clear demands: the people 
wanted Mubarak and his government to resign; corruption to end and democratic 
equality to be instated. Eighteen days after the first wave of big protests Mubarak 
finally resigned, and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) took over the 
process (Brown, 2013, p.45-46). 
The following winter of ‘11/’12, the first parliamentary elections were 
held where the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafies2 won a clear majority. The 
summer of 2012 Presidential elections were held when the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
representative Mohammed Morsi won and became Egypt’s first democratically 
elected president (Brown, 2013, p.48). Though Morsi won the democratic 
elections he did not act accordingly, and added a constitutional amendment that 
granted him “God-like” powers, unquestionable by the judiciary or legislature 
(Naguib, 2013). Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood government failed to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 Salafies are hard-line islamists who represent a much more rigid form of islamism than the Muslim 
Brotherhood does. They believe in returning to the core principles of Islam, and to a society in which the founder 
of the religion, Prophet Muhammed, lived in ca 1400 years ago (Rogan, 2009, p.141). Due to an increased 
popularity of political islam, the Salafies are popular among many poor and marginalized Egyptians 
(Kirkpatrick, 2011). 
  11 
consolidate the democracy, and many Egyptians feared they would gradually 
‘islamize’ the country turning it into a Muslim caliphate. Whether this was 
Morsi’s plan or not, the country experienced extreme polarization during his rule 
pitting his supporters against his opponents (Brown, 2013, p.50-51). 
This culminated in demonstrations against his rule in the tens of millions 
on June 30th, 2013. In the midst of this popular revolt the SCAF gave Morsi an 
ultimatum: reverse Egypt’s polarization and stabilize the country, or resign. Morsi 
was unable to do this within the required 48 hours, and refused to resign, why the 
SCAF decided to oust him through a military coup. The SCAF then instituted an 
interim government, and cracked down on Muslim Brotherhood demonstrations 
and sit-ins, at one point killing over one thousand protesters after demanding they 
disperse (Whitson, 2013). The interim government has now drafted and passed a 
new protest law which has been criticized by the UN, Human Rights Watch, and 
Amnesty International among others (Human Rights Watch, 2013). The Muslim 
Brotherhood have been labeled as an illegal terrorist organization, and have been 
forced underground. Mohammed Morsi and many other Muslim Brothers in high 
positions are in court under criminal trials and investigations (BBC, 2013a). 
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5 Analysis 
In the wake of Mubarak’s overthrow, most observers believed that the initiative 
for restructuring the societal and political systems would lie in the hands of the 
young pro-revolutionary forces. However, it soon became obvious that there was, 
and still is, a growing opposition to the revolution and its increasingly fragmented 
revolutionary forces. The opposition to the youth-activists was made up of the 
“old regime”, opportunistic Islamists and the SCAF, all of whom are considered 
to be political elite3 (Armbrust, 2013, p.834-835). Furthermore, in the upsetting 
political and societal landscape, new pacts and unlikely alliances have emerged 
and deepened the cleavages in the society. The army shifted from being allied to 
the old regime, to being an uneasy partner to the Muslim Brotherhood and then 
once again an ally of non-Islamists and protectors of the “popular will”. The 
loosely aligned liberals, leftists and nationalists (representing ‘liberal’ and secular 
parties), shifted from supporting democratic elections to backing a “democratic” 
coup out of the fear that the elected Islamists might monopolize and never give up 
power in a new regime. The Brotherhood’s strategy also shifted from 
“participation not domination” to a strategy where they came to control the 
legislature and the presidency (Tabaar, 2013, p.727). 
Precisely which actors played the biggest role in the process and how they 
shifted their strategies in order to serve their own self-interests is what we have 
sought to clarify in our analysis. Furthermore, during a democratization process, 
the “democratic” elections and constitution-drafting play an important role in 
defining the game-rules. Therefore we have analyzed the outcomes of these 
processes as well. Finally, we are well aware that many other factors than those 
mentioned above affect the democratization process and therefore we have 
dedicated a section to analyze the Egyptian economy and the abuse of the human 
rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 One must note that the Muslim Brotherhood’s position has changed in the past three years from being a semi-
illegal sort of NGO, to a part of the political elite, to the ruling party, and now a terrorist organization with the 
decree on the 25th of December 2013 (BBC, 2013a). 
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5.1 Transitional actors 
5.1.1 The military 
There is no doubt that the military played an important role in shaping the post-
Mubarak political landscape in Egypt. In fact, a wide range of people believe that 
the military contributed a great deal in Egypt’s failed democratization. Atef Said, 
a human rights researcher, argues that the military has been in charge during the 
transition period which brings about a dual paradox:  the first is that the SCAF 
continues to constitute a central apparatus in Egyptian political society - the army 
leaders are a part of the ruling regime that was overthrown in 2011 and are thus 
not neutral. The second factor relates to the fact that an institution such as the 
military, that is based on hierarchy, strict regulation, and obedience has been 
leading the transition to democracy (Said, 2012, p.397). With these paradoxes in 
mind, Said seeks to provide explanation to two questions: first, why the army 
decided to side with the revolution in January 2011, and second, following the 
revolution why the Egyptian military leaders resisted major political reforms 
(ibid. 2012, p.398). 
An argumentation to the first question is that the military was involved in 
a set of complex economic, social-demographic, historical/cultural, and 
international geopolitical factors that altogether have influenced military’s actions 
and more or less forced them to side with the people in order to preserve their own 
self-interests. These factors are: the army’s economic empire; its social base; the 
army’s constructed image as the founder of the modern Egypt state (established 
after the Free Officer’s military coup 1952); and the army’s ties to the United 
States. A combination of these factors contributed to the army taking a stand 
against the National Democratic Party’s (NDP4) government during the revolution 
(ibid. 2012, p.398-400). The army leaders were not prepared to hold power, but 
did so on the condition that they could retain their position in the Egyptian 
economy and also to keep receiving the annual $1.3 billion in US military aid. 
Since then, the army leaders have continued to navigate between contradictory 
goals, aiming to establish a conditional democracy that would allow them to 
maintain their privileges (Dahshan, 2014). 
Leaving the state apparatus to the military has been one of the most 
problematic issues in the transitional period. Tamer Wagieh argues that:  
 
“It is expected that any ruling class against which any revolution took place will fight 
back. But the most ironic and unfortunate story of our revolution is that we gave our 
corrupt ruling class a golden opportunity to destroy the revolution and shatter its 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 The National Democratic Party was Mubarak’s political party whose headquarters were burned down during 
the revolution in 2011. In addition to that, the party has been restricted from free participation in the political 
context, though individual members may run for office (Shenker, 2011). 
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revolutionaries. It is a golden opportunity because they control the most important and 
influential posts in the state.” (ibid. 2012, p.419). 
 
 The crisis of legitimacy of military rule in Egypt will play a significant 
role in influencing the military’s actions and affect the power relations in Egypt 
for years to come (ibid. 2012, p.425). 
 
5.1.2 The Muslim Brotherhood 
Another actor that was expected to play a big role, and certainly did, was the 
Muslim Brotherhood – an Islamist political organization founded in 1928. While, 
as mentioned earlier, many expected the Egyptians who demonstrated on Tahrir 
Square would form the core of new parties that would take the lead in a reformed 
democratic Egypt, the military and the old rooted Muslim Brotherhood ensured 
that no new groups would hold power in the post-Mubarak era (Day, 2011, p.6). 
On the contrary, the revolution provided the Muslim Brotherhood with a 
window of opportunity to quickly grab a hold of the power through democratic 
elections. The organization was technically illegal during Mubarak’s rule, partly 
because of the fact that the US provided the military with 1.3$ million in aid per 
year with a tacit understanding that the Brotherhood would be kept away from 
power. However, during the revolution the US tactics shifted and President 
Obama stated that the Egyptian Islamists should have a “seat at the table”, and the 
military took him by his word (ibid. 2011, p.6-7). 
5.2 Post-Mubarak politics 
There were two specific issues that played a certain role in shaping Egypt after the 
revolution. The first one concerned strong civil society and the revolution fever, 
and the second concerned the duality in power in Egypt - the Muslim Brotherhood 
on one hand, and the military on the other (Said, 2012, p.426-427). These issues 
are also touched on by Stepan and Linz in their recent article, Democratization 
Theory and the ‘Arab Spring’. They also argue that a healthy political society is 
crucial for the consolidation of a new democracy, and that there must be 
organized groups of political activists that can resist dictatorship and reach 
consensus between them (Stepan and Linz, 2013, p.22-23). While the 
“democratic” process after Mubarak’s ouster should have ensured that such an 
ideal political society took form, representing the civil society as well as the 
political elite, things took a different turn in Egypt. 
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5.2.1 Elections framework 
Before analyzing the recent elections, it is important to explain how elections 
have been managed in the past. Both the NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood used 
corrupt tactics for several decades before the revolution to increase their 
electorate. Naguib claims that the Brotherhood handed out rice, oil, and other 
subsidiaries to poor and rural communities in Egypt, in return for votes. He also 
claims that the NDP used similar tactics but instead of offering commodities, they 
threatened to take them away. They threatened to stop the flow of water and 
refused handing out subsidized fertilizer to Egyptian agricultural communities if 
they chose not to vote for them (Naguib, 2013). These tactics are those of 
“authoritarian-democratic hybrids” where people may have been given the right to 
vote but no emphasis is put on civic freedoms and political rights. At the same 
time the presence of violence against opposition groups, the media and the 
civilian organizations is high. In such regimes, the government uses its dominance 
and economic resources to counter the opposition by making it harder for people 
in certain areas to vote while making it easier to vote where they hold great 
support, exactly as it is going on in Egypt. These tactics contribute to the 
difficulties these regimes will face during their democratic consolidation (Linde 
and Ekman, 2006, p.117-118). It is these kinds of regimes that O’Donnell and 
Schmitter argue include limited liberalization but fail to present a full democracy 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p.8-9). 
These corrupt tactics are what the youth revolutionaries were initially 
revolting against. This is also why the January 2011 revolution is seen by many 
analysts, including our interviewees, as simply a “revolt” rather than a revolution 
because it did not manage to change these manipulative structures and tactics in 
the country (Beinin, 2013). 
5.2.2 Post-Mubarak elections 
In the aftermath of Mubarak’s overthrow, Egyptians were called to the polls over 
and over, for a total of five national elections, but every vote seemed to increase 
political/societal polarization rather than manage or resolve the problems (Brown, 
2013, p.46). Partly, this was because of the timing of the first parliamentary 
elections in September 2011. The SCAF, who dominated the election process, 
gave insufficient time for new parties to organize properly and on top of that, 
designed extreme requirements for registration of any new parties (Day, 2011, 
p.6). In a democratization process, elites and the masses must trust their political 
parties to be the ones to facilitate the transition by providing choices for voters 
and by acting as guardians of democracy (Fish and Wittenberg, 2012, p.194). But 
because of the prevailing circumstances, Egypt’s revolutionary secular youths 
lacked equivalently strong political parties to represent them and were left 
disappointed (Said, 2012, p.427). 
According to Brown, two things were needed in order for Egypt to 
manage a successful transition that goes hand in hand with transitology theories: a 
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broad agreement among elites on the game-rules of the transition, and a process 
that would allow the people to express their will without the government ruling 
over it. The problem was not the elections, but the fact that elections’ losers would 
not accept the result outcomes delegitimizing them and deepening the polarization 
(Brown, 2013, p.46) (Karvonen, 1996, p.77). 
The polarization, together with the political elite’s failure to cooperate, 
started already when the Egyptians first were called to the polls in March 2011 to 
approve a series of constitutional amendments that presented an option on how to 
build a new constitutional order. According to Brown, with support of our 
interviewees, the Islamists and the deep-rooted Muslim Brotherhood embraced the 
referendum that promised a quick transition process and called for a rapid voting 
of a new president and parliament via elections. Embracing these referendums 
were clearly in the Brotherhood’s best interest since they would be the most 
popular contestants and experience minimal threats from revolutionary forces. 
Non-islamists on the other hand, wished for the constitution to be drafted first but 
failed to provide an alternative plan for a transition (Brown, 2013, p.47). Youth 
revolutionaries, according to activist Mina Naguib, also called for a new 
constitution to be drafted before elections took place, otherwise, as Naguib points 
out: “How can we vote on a new President when we don’t know what powers 
he/she will have?” (Naguib, 2013). Many liberals pointed out that the military 
should “at the very least appoint a committee of experts to draft the constitution” 
(Stepan and Linz, 2013, p.21). The main problem was that the authoritarian 
military structure was, and still is, so deep-rooted in Egypt that insight and 
inclusion in this process was not required, and the SCAF could make their own 
rules for the transitional framework (Hassan, 2013). The approval of the 
constitutional amendments was later on dismissed by the military, under what 
they called “revolutionary legitimacy”. Instead of the people deciding, the 
generals wrote a new constitution on how the state should be run during a 
transition and this fact brought proof that the constitution was whatever the 
political elites said it was (Brown, 2013, p.47). When the military further decided 
to draft 6 new articles to the constitution it deepened the polarization and split the 
revolutionary movement down the middle. According to Mina Naguib, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists supported the idea of voting yes for these 
new articles knowing that if elections were to be held sooner rather than later, 
they would win much popular support. The secular youth revolutionaries on the 
other hand, opposed the idea of voting for new articles to a constitution that they 
were not a part of drafting. At this point, the Brotherhood stood for “stability” and 
promoted reform from within the system5 (Naguib, 2013). 
The next two elections came in 2011 and 2012 as Egyptians voted for the 
lower and upper houses of parliament. The Islamists won a majority but it meant 
little because of two reasons: First, the military had taken care in the constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 It is important to note here that the Brotherhood acted as a populist party when promoting stability, knowing 
that many of their voters were suffering from the lack of tourism and continuous SCAF-imposed curfews which 
hurt their businesses (The Tower, 2013). 
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declaration to ensure that the parliament would not have the power to pass 
legislation without the generals’ approval. The military soon realized itself that it 
engineered a plan that gave it an oversight role but only temporarily; once the new 
President was sworn in, the military would lose its powers (Brown, 2013, p.47-
48). Therefore, the military needed the Brotherhood to act as an ally in drafting a 
constitution that retained the military’s interests, and the Brotherhood was not a 
partner that was willing to give in for the military’s demands (Said, 2012, p.426-
427). Second, as Mina Naguib puts it, the outcomes of the first parliamentary 
election were so dissatisfying to many, that very few people went to vote on the 
elections for the second parliamentary election, taking away from the second 
election results’ legitimacy (Naguib, 2013). 
5.2.3 Drafting the constitution 
A new constitution is without a doubt a fundamental point in Egypt’s effort to 
build a democratic policy that would ensure the rule of law, and maximize the 
core values of any democracy. Many hoped that the writing of the constitution 
would embrace the democratic values and was therefore supposed to manifest a 
consensus across the political spectrum following the disposal of authoritarian 
rule (Taher, 2013, p.25). 
However, as mentioned earlier, the referendum revealed a quite different 
picture than was first imagined. The writing of the constitution that started in 
March 2011 led to a polarized political landscape, divided into two contradictory 
visions where each party had its own priorities, ambitions and understandings of 
national interests (ibid. 2013, p.26). According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan the 
polarization was a consequence of Egypt’s lack of political society: 
 
“Although Egypt arguably had a more creative civil society than did Tunisia, the former’s 
specifically political society was and is woefully underdeveloped. As late as four months 
after Mubarak’s February 2011 ouster, the two key social groups that had opposed him—
secular liberals and the Muslim Brotherhood—still had not held a single joint meeting to 
discuss democratic governing alternatives.” 
 
Without the ability to reach any form of collaboration early in the process, the 
polarization would only be intensified (Stepan and Linz, 2013, p.23). Egypt’s 
leading political forces simply failed to design a settlement, a sort of pact, which 
would define the rules on the basis of mutual guarantees of those entering into it – 
a pact that probably would lead to a different outcome (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 
1986, p.37). 
Egypt’s mistakes are a consequence of all Egyptian politicians, argues 
Ahmed Taher, and comes to the conclusion that the political actors should bear 
the responsibility for errors that have been made even before the country’s first 
civilian presidential election (Taher, 2013, p.26). One of these errors occurred 
during November 2011 with the “El-Selmi Document”. The document represented 
a set of principles regarding the prospective constitution that gave the military 
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immunity from civilian oversight and intended to establish a National Defense 
Council as the only body allowed to discuss military-related matters. This 
document sparked a demonstration of more than one million people on Cairo’s 
streets that demanded the document’s annulment. Predictably, this led to the 
security forces attacking protesters and the clashes resulted in deaths of dozens of 
people and wounds of hundreds (ibid. 2013, p.27). 
The clashes continued between different parties after the elections for 
Egypt’s parliament (ibid. 2013, p.27). The Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafies 
won a clear majority of the seats which angered the “rest” of Egyptian society 
greatly. Many secular activists, including Mina Naguib himself, felt that the 
Brotherhood had hijacked the revolution and used their deep-rooted organization 
to quickly earn seats in parliament before any kind of political society had been 
established (Naguib, 2013). 
The chosen houses of parliament were then supposed to choose one 
hundred Egyptians who would draft a new document during the course of 6 
months. The Parliament had no guidance on who should serve among the 
constitution-writers, and here the involved parts failed to reach consensus. The 
result was that the Islamists selected a body that was half made up of parliament-
members (dominated by islamists), and half was drawn from various social groups 
and official bodies. Many non-islamists disliked the process and by the help of an 
administrative court, stopped it altogether claiming that the assembly was 
unrepresentative. The result could have been beneficial if it had led to an 
agreement among Egypt’s rivaling political groups, but instead it led to the 
Parliament once again failing to reach consensus. It ended up with the Islamist 
majority later selecting a similar body to replace the former constitution-writing 
committee (Brown, 2013, p.47-48). The Islamist majority in the both chambers 
resulted in manifested society-wide divisions which deepened the polarization. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court declared the people’s Assembly 
unconstitutional, which led to the dissolution of the Parliament right before the 
Presidential elections, an act which widened the gap between the two sides - both 
feeling betrayed by democratic manipulations (Taher, 2013, p.27-28). 
Later on, in May 2012, Egyptians were once again called out to the polls 
to vote, now on a new President. Not only was the parliament disbanded, but the 
military also sprang another constitutional declaration that stripped the President 
of significant power, and created a continuously strong role for the military in the 
constitution-drafting (Brown, 2013, p.48-49). 
5.2.4 Presidential elections  
Regardless of the events that occurred before the elections, many revolutionaries 
were relieved that the representative of the old regime and prime minister during 
Mubarak’s rule, Ahmed Shafiq, was defeated. Instead Muhammad Morsi, the 
Muslim Brotherhood candidate, won a marginal victory (Taher, 2013, p.28). This 
was seen as a democratic victory as it was the first democratically elected civilian 
government in Egypt’s entire political history. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and 
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secular activists across Egypt rejoiced as Morsi defeated Ahmed Shafiq, and many 
thought Egypt was on its way to a more successful transition (Naguib, 2013). To 
many people’s disappointment, the political battle between the Brotherhood and 
the military was soon on again. Morsi removed the top leaders of the SCAF and 
announced their Constitutional Declaration invalid. He took a major step in 
attempting to end the long-standing military rule and started a new era in the 
revolutionary process that included a new constitution to restructure government 
institutions, reform the country’s political system, and regulate the relationship 
between government authorities. Most important, the new constitution was to 
cherish human rights and freedoms (Taher, 2013, p.28). Opponents of the 
Brotherhood felt that although Morsi was voted into power through democratic 
elections, and spoke of democratic reforms, he did not act democratically. The 
“alarms”, argues Naguib, became clear quite early in Morsi’s presidency. The 
major alarm came about when Morsi announced a constitutional decree that 
granted him “God-Like” powers over the judiciary and the legislature (Naguib, 
2013). The decree exempted “all of Morsi’s decisions from legal challenge until a 
new parliament is elected”. Although Morsi claimed this was to protect the goals 
of the revolution, it enhanced his own authority and the people of Egypt felt their 
initial empowerment crumble (Godfrey & Beaumont, 2012). 
Both Mina Naguib and freelance journalist Helena Hägglund agree with 
the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood adopted the same tactics and behavior as the 
authoritarian regimes before them. They allude to the fact that the revolution did 
not manage to dismantle the authoritarian political structures, and until that 
happens, any regime that takes power will be forced to work within an 
authoritarian framework. This framework embodies: no dialogue with political 
opponents, harsh tactics against political dissidents, intolerance for critical 
journalists and other undemocratic features (Naguib, 2013) (Hägglund, 2013). In 
this sense, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to achieve what both Linz & Stepan, 
and O’Donnell & Schmitter persistently argued for in their theories: the 
importance of creating new and functional game-rules. 
5.3 The military coup 
5.3.1 Morsi’s ouster 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s rule of Egypt was indeed problematic. Hamdi Hassan, 
former regional advisor to international IDEA’s MENA program, claims:  
 
“When this man Morsi came in, he didn’t understand. I mean he did not understand 
anything. I mean he was just working, taking orders from the Muslim Brotherhood. This 
is a deep, totalitarian, tyrannical state, and if you are the supreme commander, you must 
understand what this military is about!” (Hassan, 2013) 
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In many ways, Mohammed Morsi gravely underestimated the SCAF and their 
ability to shape and intervene in Egyptian politics in the name of state security. 
When Morsi attempted to weaken the SCAF’s power, he removed several 
generals from the head of the SCAF. The Defense Minister Mohamed Hussein 
Tantawi was replaced by Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, along with several other high-
positioned generals. This however did not bring about a major change since it did 
not change the military’s core structure, but only replaced old faces with new ones 
(Ahram Online, 2012).  
Morsi’s ouster was started by a civil movement called Tamarod, which 
started to collect signatures in early 2013 from supporters in favor of ending 
Morsi’s rule. The movement managed to collect 22 million signatures before the 
first anniversary of his presidency and gathered in the tens of millions in the 
streets of Egypt to demand that Morsi step down and new elections to be held. 
The immense numbers of demonstrators on June 30th 2013 gave the military a 
mandate to demand Morsi’s resignation (Kingsley, 2013). A popular rumor in 
Egypt today is that the Tamarod movement was in fact funded by the military in 
secret, and human rights defender Mariam Kirollos indeed regrets signing their 
petition (Kirollos, 2013). 
5.3.2 Implications of the coup 
An important aspect of transitology that Stepan and Linz bring forth is about 
“authoritarian-democratic hybrids”, where the leaders embrace core democratic 
values to gain legitimacy, but keep authoritarian controls in order to keep power. 
In these “situations”, the ruling apparatus is dissatisfied with democracy, and will 
most likely turn the country back to fully-fledged authoritarianism through a 
military coup (Stepan and Linz, 2013, p.20-21). This is how the situation is 
developing in Egypt. The military started to feel undermined and saw their 
country crumble under a democracy that would strip them of their powers. Even 
though the revolution did not manage to change the authoritarian structure, it has 
brought the military under a “legitimacy crisis” for years to come (Said, 2012, 
p.422-423). Also the people we have interviewed are in agreement and argue that 
the Egyptian authoritarian military structure is one of the biggest obstacles to 
Egypt’s democracy. 
Instead of the military having a marginalized role in the process, they have 
been given mandate to expand their powers, and thus decide where Egypt’s 
democracy will head. One of the most striking implications of the coup was the 
blatant massacre over one thousand protesters outside the Rabaa al Adawiya 
square, in the Cairo suburb of Nasr City (Whitson, 2013). On August 14th, 2013, 
several thousand protesters were taking part in a sit-in which had been maintained 
on the Rabaa al Adawiya square since the July 3rd ouster of Mohammed Morsi. 
The military had informed the protesters that on this day they would “disperse” 
and demanded they leave the square. Afterwards, they proceeded to storm the 
protest camp and fired tear gas and live ammunition into the crowds, killing over 
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one thousand people, including the 17 year old daughter of a Muslim Brotherhood 
leader and a Sky-News cameraman (BBC, 2013b). 
5.4 Other influental factors 
5.4.1 Egyptian economy 
Another important aspect of the democratization process is the economy. 
Transition processes often go hand in hand with greater economic crises and it is 
of great importance that those who govern are able to tackle these crises 
(Karvonen, 1996, p.77). It was the economic circumstances that sparked the initial 
Arab Spring protests in Tunisia. Also in Egypt, the economy is the reason for the 
widespread disillusionment and anger seen during the revolution. According to 
economist Mohamed Dahshan, prior to the revolution there were about 4,5 million 
people employed in the public sector. Not only were these people underemployed 
(not paid enough to support their families and forced to take other jobs as well) 
but they were used inefficiently because one person could do the job that three 
employees were paid to do (Dahshan, 2013). 
Another huge issue in Egypt is that of government subsidies. The 
government subsidized basic commodities, and have been doing so since the 
Second World War. Dr. Hafez Salmawy, during the latest “Cairo Climate Talks”, 
claims that subsidies take up roughly 27% of Egypt’s budget (Cairo Climate 
Talks, 2013). Mohamed Dahshan says that no political leader in Egypt has the 
courage to speak publically about tackling these issues because it will inevitably 
lead to lifting the subsidies. Former president Anwar Sadat attempted this kind of 
reform when he lifted bread-subsidies but was soon met with an immense wave of 
protests and riots which forced him to reinstate the subsidy. However, Dahshan 
points out that the leaders should be persistent. He speaks about the need for 
leaders to level with the people of Egypt, explaining to them that if they want to 
achieve economic reform, and improve on both social and democratic institutions 
in the country, they need to be ready to sacrifice. He speaks of the “J-Curve” that 
suggests that things will get slightly worse before they get better, but provides the 
only sustainable option in the long-run (Dahshan, 2013). 
The January 2011 revolution called for improved welfare institutions as 
well as democratic ones. This meant improved public education, improved public 
health care, infrastructure and other aspects of a “modernized” society. Dahshan 
claims that with the increased revenue from gradually cutting the subsidies, the 
government will have the resources it needs to improve on all these institutions, 
including democratic ones such as elections (ibid. 2013). But with the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s inability to improve on the economic issues during their rule, it led 
to even deeper economic and financial problems (growing poverty and mass-
unemployment) in early months of 2013. These factors contributed to mass 
dissatisfaction and eventually to bringing the country into chaos (Tabaar, 2013, 
p.727). 
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5.4.2 Human rights abuses 
Another important issue in transitology is the principle of human rights and 
citizenship. (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p.7-8) In Egypt, the government 
used sexual harassment to eradicate the protest movements and the calls for 
democratic reform, and in that way disrespected the basic human rights. Mariam 
Kirollos, Egyptian defender of Human Rights, has under many years documented 
sexual harassment in Egypt. Mariam claims one can trace this tactic back to May 
25th, 2005, known as “Black Wednesday”. Female journalists were protesting in 
front of the Journalist Syndicate against a constitutional declaration by Hosni 
Mubarak which marks the first time in Egypt’s history when sexual violence was 
used by the state as a tool to marginalize and exclude women from the political 
sphere (Kirollos, 2013). 
It is through sexual harassment tactics the SCAF wanted to scare away 
women from the protest movements. On March 9th in 2011, women who were 
attending a sit-in on the Tahrir Square were forced to take part in “virginity tests” 
so that they would not be able to claim that they have been raped by security 
officials while spending the night in the square. Not only were these women 
humiliated, but bearing in mind that sexual exposure is taboo in Egyptian society, 
these women would find themselves alienated from their communities (ibid. 
2013).  
Although the Muslim Brotherhood may not be responsible for committing 
crimes of sexual harassment themselves, they did nothing to investigate the crimes 
of the former regime and hold them accountable, which is an important issue in a 
country’s transition period (Amnesty International, 2013). Kirollos asserts that the 
use of women’s bodies as a political battlefield continues, both by the 
Brotherhood and the secular opposition. Kirollos means that the politicians are 
evading the issues which actually should be discussed, namely that the state 
should provide better security for females in Egypt in public, and create a mind-
state that sexual harassment is both a female as well as a male issue. By using 
women only as bargaining chips in the political arena, and thereby neglecting the 
true problems, the politicians are as guilty as the ones committing the harassments 
and rapes (Kirollos, 2013). 
Another issue neglected by the Morsi administration is that of torture and 
cruel treatment. According to Amnesty International, one NGO recorded “88 
cases of torture or other ill-treatment by police during President Morsi’s first 100 
days in office” (Amnesty International, 2013). Furthermore, under Morsi’s rule 
the military was given constitutional right to try civilians for crimes in a military 
court. Thus, the government has failed to provide one of the core democratic 
rights: the right to be tried by a fair civilian jury. According to Amnesty 
International, over 1 000 people have been imprisoned through military trials 
during and after Morsi’s rule (ibid. 2013). 
During Morsi’s rule and in the aftermath of his ouster, the most human 
rights abuses have been those against freedom of expression. Several 
constitutional amendments implemented by Morsi’s government banned 
‘insulting of religion’ and ‘insulting of the president’. As a consequence, many 
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Egyptians were arrested and given prison sentences because of public statements 
against Islam or the president (ibid, 2013). Also, after Morsi’s ouster, many 
human rights activists and revolutionaries have been harassed, arrested, and 
effectively silenced. Ahmed Maher who is the founder of the April 6th movement, 
a movement that was targeted responsible for the initial January 2011 protests, 
now faces a 3 year prison sentence for “organizing an unauthorized protest” 
(Guerin, 2013). Another two activists who were symbols of Mubarak’s 
opposition, Alaa Abdel Fattah and Mona Seif,  today face a 1 year sentence each 
for ‘thuggery’, ‘assault’, and taking part in illegal protests (Ahram Online, 2013c). 
These are just some examples from a nationwide crackdown on the opposition. 
Many of the people being jailed now served jail-terms during Mubarak accused of 
similar falsified crimes, which shows the true irony of today’s Egypt. The current 
military-appointed government has hijacked the revolutionary movement and used 
it as legitimacy when arresting the same people who truly started the revolution 
(Jones, 2013). The reason this kind of “silencing” is the worst form of human 
rights abuse is because without people actively speaking out against crimes 
against humanity, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other 
organizations would not have the information they need, and an authoritarian 
entity like the SCAF would be able to run Egypt like the army they command. 
 
 
5.5 Situation today 
Today, the political polarization in Egypt is clear. Whether the conflict is seen as a 
clash between secular and religious actors, or between non-liberal democrats or 
undemocratic liberals, the polarization has never been this deep (Tabaar, 2013, 
p.728). Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood feel undermined because the 
political leaders they voted into the parliament and government are being tried in 
court for “inciting to the killing of protesters” (Nasralla et.al., 2013). The political 
party they belong to has been deemed illegal (Al Jazeera, 2013a). In the aftermath 
of the military coup which ended the year-long rule of the Brotherhood in Egypt, 
the military structure (through the military-appointed interim government) has 
drafted and passed a new ‘protest-law’. This law has given the government the 
right to crack down on, not only on the illegal Muslim Brotherhood organization, 
but also the secular youth activists who started the 2011 revolution that ousted 
President Hosni Mubarak, sentencing many to long jail terms (Kholaif, 2013).    
Another important development is the Muslim Brotherhood’s new legal 
status in Egypt. Not only are they banned as an organization and political party, 
they are now also labeled as a ‘terrorist organization’ (BBC, 2013a). The 
government has also seized over one hundred schools across Egypt that were run 
by Brotherhood leaders. (Ahram Online, 2013a)  Mahmoud Taha, former deputy 
governor to the city of Minya in Upper Egypt during the Brotherhood’s rein, met 
with us and reinforced these facts about the Brotherhood’s situation today. He 
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himself feels very scared, and is relieved that his identity as former deputy 
governor is not widely-known as he was never the face of the governorate of 
Minya. He claims that the Muslim Brotherhood will keep fighting against the 
totalitarian regime imposed by the SCAF, by protesting, creating awareness, and 
boycotting the upcoming elections on the drafting of the constitution which 
widely supports the army’s strongly influencing role in Egyptian politics (Taha, 
2014). Although Taha’s claims of human-rights abuses against the Brotherhood 
are questionable, the state does not want international journalists to get a hold of 
this information. In fact, on the 29th of December, a group of Al-Jazeera 
journalists were arrested in Egypt for having “illegal meetings” with the Muslim 
Brotherhood after interviewing a Brotherhood representative (Al Jazeera, 2013b).  
Meanwhile, the military is using the revolution for gaining legitimacy as 
Egypt’s ruling authority. Their propaganda is widespread and successful, and 
today all over Cairo one cannot miss the billboards and signs with the slogan: 
“Say yes to the constitution!”. 
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6 Conclusion 
In any democracy, the people must look to their representative political parties 
and leaders to lead the way in the democratic process. As pointed out earlier, the 
transition represents a negotiation that sets the game-rules, and it is of vital 
importance that the political actors are able to compromise and share mutual 
understanding for each other in order for the transition to succeed. If they refuse 
to do so, the core values of democracy are ultimately lost. Mohamed Dahshan 
writes about this phenomenon in his article entitled “Egypt’s Compassion 
Deficit”, where he outlines Egypt’s lack of political society. In our interview with 
him, he compares Egypt’s political society to Sweden’s: 
 
“In other parts of the world different political leaders yell at each other and call each 
other idiots, and claim that their opponents will destroy the country, but then at the end of 
the day they can all go to Almedalen and get drunk together. We don’t really have that 
here. It’s almost like if we disagree with you, we’re going to want to hurt you and your 
entire family. There’s something very violent about how we perceive politics in Egypt.” 
(Dahshan, 2013) 
 
In the end, this kind of political and societal polarization played directly 
into the hands of the military structure, which used these cleavages in society as a 
legitimate reason to implement their military coup and establish the anti-
democratic protest law. 
As presented in our theory it is the actions of the political elites that 
determine in which direction democracy turns. Had the different political parties 
and organizations formed a united pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian coalition 
they could have greatly undermined the military’s authority and power. They 
could have been the ones deciding on the framework for how the constitution 
should be written, and who should write it. Instead the classic “divide and 
conquer” mechanisms were able to be implemented by an authoritarian entity like 
the SCAF. As presented in our theories and proved in our analysis, much of 
Egypt’s failure depends on its structural authoritarian past and because of this, 
Egypt has only succeeded in becoming an “authoritarian-democratic hybrid”. This 
hybrid form of regime is only temporary because this “situation” does not prevail 
and often fails to become institutionalized. What remains for Egypt is to move 
beyond its former authoritarian structure, and convert the ongoing “situation” into 
a purer democratic outcome, which in the long run, becomes institutionalized and 
protected by the constitution. 
Another problematic fact for the transition process been Egypt’s failing 
economy. The ongoing economic crisis also played into the hands of SCAF as the 
population is more concerned to put food on their tables than to engage in pro-
  26 
democratic movements. Furthermore, the high number of human rights abuses 
against the Brotherhood and the secular opposition constitutes additional obstacles 
for the democracy. However, the opposition remained headstrong and showed no 
signs of ending their protests or dissent from the authoritarian government and 
military structure. This continues to undermine the military’s legitimacy and thus 
provides hope for an Egyptian democracy. 
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1st, 2014 
32 
minutes 
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List of Questions Mohammed 
Dahshan 
Hamdi 
Hassan 
Helena 
Hägglund 
Mariam 
Kirollos 
Mina 
Naguib 
Mahmoud 
Taha 
What was the biggest bactor 
in Egypt’s failed transition? 
x x x x x  
 
Was the democratic process 
rushed? 
 
 
x x x x  
 
Should there have been a 
constitution before an 
election? 
 
 
x x x x  
 
What kind of insight does 
the legislature have into the 
SCAF? 
 
 
x  
 
 
 
x  
 
What kind of human rights 
abuses were committed 
during Morsi? During 
SCAF? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x  
 
 
 
How could so many people 
in Egypt blindly support the 
military coup of 2013? 
 
 
 
 
x  
 
x  
 
What needs to amended in 
the constitution? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x  
 
How many people are 
illiterate in Egypt? 
x  
 
 
 
 
 
x  
 
Which Egyptians do 
subsidies effect? 
x  
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Egypt? 
x  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the Brotherhood’s 
plan for the future? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
How is the Brotherhood 
operating under current 
conditions? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
Did the Brotherhood 
support the initial 
constitutional referendum 
presented by the SCAF? 
x x x x x x 
 
